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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes are a basic tenet of the law. Without disputes there would be no
need for the courts, no need for judicial decisions. Whether the conflict is
between individuals, statutes, or constitutional provisions, the courts must stand
as referees to render final judgment in the contest presented. Fresenius USA, Inc.
v. Baxter International, Inc.1 addresses a controversy involving the conflicting
interests of Articles I and III of the United States Constitution.
Fresenius concerns the question of how the jurisdictional restrictions of
Article III can impact a proceeding involving the Patent Clause of Article I.2
The holding of Fresenius is heart wrenching. It is the equivalent of watching a
brilliantly victorious fencer being stripped of a hard fought championship on
account of some obscure, seldom-invoked regulation.3
The decision has had a significant impact in the competitive world of
patents, an impact which has yet to be fully realized.4 Although the decision is
not without its critics,5 it is based upon a longstanding technicality of law.
Because the technicality exists, the rule must be enforced. But technicalities can
be changed, and Fresenius emphasizes one such technicality that needs to be
changed.
II. EN GARDE: FRESENIUS USA VS. BAXTER INTERNATIONAL
The decade-long bout began when Fresenius USA, Inc. and Fresenius
Medical Care Holdings, Inc. filed for a declaratory judgment against Baxter
International, Inc. and Baxter Healthcare Corporation alleging that claims 26–

721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2295 (2014).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3 The sport of fencing is replete with obscure rules. For instance, a combatant may be
penalized a touch, or point, for failing to shake his opponent’s hand after a bout. USA FENCING,
USA FENCING RULES FOR COMPETITION, Rule .87, (2014), available at http://www.usfencing.org/
page/show/695208-rulebook (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
4 See ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 760 F.3d 1350, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The
district court found Lawson in civil contempt for violating a previously issued injunction.
Lawson appealed both the injunction and contempt order. During the pendency of Lawson’s
appeals, the United States Patent and Trademark Office completed a reexamination of the patent
in question and determined that the claim in dispute was invalid. In a separate appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the invalidity determination and the cancellation of the disputed claim. The
Federal Circuit, relying on Fresenius, vacated the injunction and contempt order because both were
based on a claim which had been cancelled.
5 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1347–65 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also ePlus, Inc., 760 F.3d at 1361–
69 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
1
2
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31 of U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434 (’434 patent) were invalid and not infringed.6
Baxter counterattacked by suing Fresenius for infringement.7
Baxter was the owner of the ’434 patent, which involved a hemodialysis
machine.8 Hemodialysis machines are used in the place of kidneys to cleanse
the blood of toxins.9 When a person’s blood is pumped through the machine,
toxins pass from the blood into a solution called dialysate.10 The relevant
claims of the ’434 patent teach the use of a dialysis machine with an integrated
touch screen interface.11
In 2003, Fresenius, a manufacturer of hemodialysis machines, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking
declaratory judgments of invalidity and non-infringement with respect to three
Baxter patents, including claims 26–31 of the ’434 patent, as well as claims
involving U.S. Patent No. 5,744,027 (’027 patent) and U.S. Patent No. 6,284,131
(’131 patent).12 In riposte,13 Baxter counterclaimed for infringement.14 Fresenius
actually stipulated to the infringement of the ’434 patent’s claims, but argued that
the claims were invalid.15 A jury returned a verdict in Fresenius’s favor, finding
the relevant claims of the ’434 patent invalid and that certain claims of the ’027
and ’131 patents invalid.16
Fresenius’s early touch was quickly met and surpassed as the district court
granted Baxter’s motion for judgment as a matter of law finding insufficient
evidence to prove that the patents’ claims were invalid.17 A jury trial on
damages was then conducted, and the jury awarded Baxter $14.266 million for
infringement on the three patents.18 The district court then entered a
Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1331.
Id.
8 Id. at 1332.
9 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
10 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332.
11 Id.
12 Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C03–1431, 2007 WL 518804, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007). The original complaint included two additional Baxter patents, U.S.
Patent No. 5,326,476 (’476 patent) and U.S. Patent No. 5,486,286 (’286 patent). The district court
dismissed all claims concerning the ’286 patent in 2006, while Baxter dismissed the ’476 patent
claims from the suit prior to the damages trial. Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332 n.1.
13 A riposte is an attack immediately following the parry of an opponent’s attack. Glossary of
Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2015).
14 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1332–33.
18 Id. at 1333.
6
7
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permanent injunction, which was stayed, and bestowed upon Baxter ongoing
post-verdict royalties on infringing machines and related disposables sold by
Fresenius.19 Both parties, not surprisingly, appealed.20
On September 10, 2009, the Federal Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the district court.21 The Federal
Circuit held that the asserted claims of the ’027 and ’131 patents were invalid,
reversing the district court’s decision blessing Baxter’s motion for a judgment as
a matter of law.22 The court, however, did find that Fresenius had failed to
present sufficient evidence that the claims of the ’434 patent at issue were
obvious.23 These claims required a “means for delivering the dialysate to a
dialysate compartment of a hemodialyzer.”24 The court stated that Fresenius
had “failed to present any evidence . . . that the structure corresponding to the
means for delivering dialysate limitation, or an equivalent thereof, existed in the
prior art.”25 The Federal Circuit further decreed that because Fresenius had
failed to present any evidence that the structure in question existed in the prior
art, a judgment as a matter of law was appropriate.26
Thus the court affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of
law regarding the ’434 patent claims, reversed the district court regarding the
other two patents, and vacated the district court’s injunction and royalty
awards.27 The Federal Circuit directed on remand that the district court revise
or reconsider its injunction in light of the court’s reversal regarding the ’027 and
’131 patents.28 The district court was also “to consider whether the previous
[royalty] award [wa]s proper in light of [the Federal Circuit’s] modification of
the district court’s judgment.”29 The Federal Circuit noted that, “[i]n
particular, . . . our decision . . . may [have] affect[ed] how the district court
weighs [the relevant] factors” in determining the royalty award.30
On remand, Baxter lunged for “a final decision on the permanent injunction
and ongoing royalties.”31 Fresenius parried, asserting that it was no longer
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id.
Fresenius, 582 F.3d at 1291.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1303.
Id.
Id.
Fresenius, 723 F.3d at 1333.
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selling the infringing machines, rendering the injunction unnecessary, and that
the ordered royalties were unreasonable. Fresenius also sought to retry the preverdict damages on the ’434 patent.32 On May 26, 2011, the district court
denied Fresenius’s motion for a new trial on the question of pre-verdict
damages.33 In December 2011, the district court then held an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of post-verdict royalties.34 By this time, the permanent
injunction had become moot as the ’434 patent had expired in April 2011.35
On March 8, 2012, the district court awarded Baxter post-verdict damages,
but at a reduced royalty rate.36 On March 16, 2012, the district court entered its
final judgment for Baxter.37 Fresenius was ordered to pay Baxter over $23
million in damages and interest, in addition to royalties, for units sold prior to
the expiration of the ’434 patent.
Naturally, Fresenius appealed.38 Baxter countered, cross-appealing the
district court’s reduction of the post-verdict royalties.39 On May 3, 2012, the
district court granted Fresenius’s motion to stay the execution of the new
judgment pending appeal.40 In granting the stay, the district court rejected the
argument that Baxter was entitled to enforce and execute the 2007 judgment.41
The district court explained that “the March 16, 2012 final judgment appears to
supercede [sic] the Nov. 7, 2007 final judgment.”42
In the meantime, while the parties were thrusting accusations back and forth
in the third branch of government, Fresenius performed a brilliant attaque au
fer.43 In 2005, Fresenius requested an ex parte reexamination with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) of claims 26–31 of the ’434 patent,
the only claims which were ultimately remaining in the pending infringement
litigation.44 In January 2006, the PTO agreed that a substantial new question of
Id.
See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03–1431, 2011 WL 2160609 (N.D. Cal. May
26, 2011).
34 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1333.
35 Id.
36 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03–1431, 2012 WL 761712, at *14–16 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 8, 2012).
37 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 An attaque au fer is an attack on the opponent’s blade. Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE,
http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
44 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334; In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g
en banc denied, 698 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
32
33
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patentability had been raised in light of new prior art, and granted the request
for a reexamination.45
The PTO’s reexamination proceeded on a parallel track with the district
court litigation.46 In December 2006, less than a year before the damages trial,
the PTO examiner raised the yellow card47 after reaching an initial
determination that the claims would have been obvious.48 A year later, in
December 2007, the red card49 went up as the PTO examiner reached a final
determination rejecting claims 26–31 of the ’434 patent.50 The examiner
concluded that all structures required by claim 26, including the “means for
delivering the dialysate,” were present in the prior art, and that the claim would
have been obvious.51 The examiner also determined that claim 30 would have
been obvious over a combination of references which were not before the PTO
during the initial examination.52 Thus, the patent examiner found new,
invalidating prior art that had not been raised in the initial examination or in the
prior district court proceedings.53
In March 2010, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upheld the
examiner’s determination that the relevant claims would have been obvious in
light of the prior art that had been overlooked in the initial examination.54
Baxter contested the examiner’s analysis of the prior art.55 The Board noted,
however, that Baxter never argued in the reexamination proceeding that one
particular reference failed to teach the “means for delivering the dialysate”
required by claim 26, nor that an additional reference failed to teach claim 30’s
“means for delivering an anticoagulant.”56 This, despite the fact that these were

Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
Id.
47 In fencing, the yellow card indicates a minor rule infraction. Glossary of Terms, SYNECDOC.BE, http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
48 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
49 The red card indicates a more serious rule infraction and results in either the loss of a touch
or a point being awarded to the other fencer. Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://www.syne
c-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). See also MAXWELL R. GARRET ET
AL., FOIL, SABER, AND ÉPÉÉ FENCING 152 (1994).
50 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
51 Ex parte Baxter, No. 2009–006493, 2010 WL 1048980, at *5–6, *8–9, *14 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 18,
2010).
52 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334; Ex parte Baxter, 2010 WL 1048980, at *15, *17.
53 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334; In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365.
54 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335.
55 Id.
56 Id. (citations omitted).
45
46
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the very elements of the claims that Baxter had successfully argued, were
missing from the prior art in the district court proceedings.57
After the Board denied rehearing, Baxter appealed to the Federal Circuit.58
The court raised the black card,59 affirming the PTO’s determination that the
rejected claims would have been obvious from the prior art.60 The court
explained the determination was not inconsistent with the court’s holding in the
infringement litigation because the examiner had “sufficiently identified the
corresponding structure recited in [claim 26 of] the ’434 patent” and could
“identif[y] the structures in the prior art” that would have rendered the asserted
claims unpatentable.61 Moreover, the examiner had “based [the] rejections on
prior art references that were not squarely at issue during the trial on the
invalidity issues.”62 The Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc,63 issuing its
mandate on November 2, 2012.64 Baxter did not file a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court of the United States.65 Fresenius’s prise de fer66 was
complete when the PTO issued a certificate cancelling claims 26–31 of the ’434
patent.67
During various periods in the judicial infringement proceedings, the district
court declined to stay the case pending the PTO reexamination.68 In June 2007,
the district court recognized the potential impact the PTO proceedings would
have on the infringement suit.69 The court acknowledged that the PTO had
“already made initial, non-final determinations that the subject claims in the
patents-in-suit are invalid,” and that “if all the claims are invalidated, as the
PTO’s initial non-final determinations might imply, there will be no issues to

Id.
Id.
59 The black card indicates the most serious offenses in a fencing competition. The offending
fencer is usually expelled from the event or tournament. Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://
www.synec-doc.be/escrime/dico/engl.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). See also MAXWELL R.
GARRET ET AL., FOIL, SABER, AND ÉPÉÉ FENCING 152 (1994).
60 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335; In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1366.
61 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335 (quoting In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1364–65).
62 Id. (quoting In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365).
63 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
64 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335.
65 Id.
66 A prise de fer, literally “taking the blade,” is an attack in which the fencer attempts to control
the opponent’s weapon. Glossary of Terms, SYNEC-DOC.BE, http://www.synec-doc.be/escrime/
dico/engl.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
67 See Ex parte Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Pat. No. 5,247,434 C1 (P.T.O. Apr. 30, 2013).
68 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335.
69 Id.
57
58
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try.”70 The court concluded that “it is also possible that the PTO’s [initial]
determination will have no ultimate bearing on the damages determination in
this case, as the PTO’s initial actions were non-final and non-binding, and the
PTO is free to reconsider its initial determinations.”71 The district court denied
the stay due to the possibility that the examiner’s determination could change.72
The district court again declined to issue a stay for similar reasons in 2011.73
On March 16, 2012, while the appeal of the PTO’s reexamination decision
was pending before the Federal Circuit, the district court entered judgment for
Baxter.74 On May 17, 2012, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s rejection of
the ’434 patent’s claims.75
In the latest Fresenius case, the court addressed the issue of whether, under
the reexamination statute, the cancelling of claims is binding in a pending
infringement case.76 The Federal Circuit ruled that it was, and thereby stripped
Baxter International of its multi-million dollar verdict.77
III. THE RULE BOOK
As with anything in life, one must know the rules. Although some legal
doctrines may be more difficult to follow than an eighteenth century
encyclopedia of chivalrous swordplay, the rules of any game must be followed.
It is by understanding the rules that success is achieved. To understand the
reissue authority of the PTO, the history and scope of that power must be
studied. This understanding is important because the reexamination statute
provides that reexamined claims “have the same effect as that specified in
section 252 for reissued patents . . . .”78
The year was 1832 and Congress had codified the Supreme Court’s decision
that even in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing reissue, where an
innocent mistake had been made in granting a patent,79 “[a]ll would admit that a
new patent, correcting the error, . . . ought to be issued.”80 In the course of the
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
72 Id.
73 Id. (citing Fresenius, 2011 WL 2160609, at *1 (“[T]he effect on this litigation of any final
action on the reexamined ‘434 patent is far from clear.”)).
74 Id. at 1336.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1347.
78 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2012).
79 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1336.
80 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 242 (1832).
70
71
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reissue proceeding, “the patent office [is] authorized to deal with all [the
patent’s] claims . . . and might declare them to be invalid.”81 The first version
of the reissue statute provided that an original patent was surrendered and
canceled upon application for reissue.82 Thus, upon surrender, the original
patent became inoperative. The patentee would then proceed to protect his
rights under the reissued patent.83
The statute was revised in 1870 to provide that the surrender and
cancellation took place upon completion of the reissue proceeding.84 Prior to
1928, reissuance of a patent extinguished all pending claims based on that
patent because the original patent was considered canceled.85 The Supreme
Court decisions construing the reissue statute “uniformly held that if a reissue is
granted, the patentee has no rights except such as grow out of the reissued
patent. He has none under the original. That is extinguished.”86 Furthermore,
when a claim was canceled pursuant to a reissue, pending litigation based upon
that claim ceased.87 As the Supreme Court explained in Moffitt v. Garr:
[I]n case of a surrender and reissue, . . . the pending suits fall with
the surrender. A surrender of the patent to the Commissioner
within the sense of the provision, means an act which, in
judgment of law, extinguishes the patent. It is a legal cancellation
of it, and hence can no more be the foundation for the assertion
of a right after the surrender, than could an act of Congress
which has been repealed. It has frequently been determined that
suits pending, which rest upon an act of Congress, fall with the
repeal of it. The reissue of the patent has no connection with or
bearing upon antecedent suits; it has as to subsequent suits. The
antecedent suits depend upon the patent existing at the time they
were commenced, and unless it exists, and is in force at the time
of trial and judgment, the suits fail.88

McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898).
See generally id. at 609–11 (where the Court examines its prior decisions and discusses the
process and setting aside and reissuing a patent..
83 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1336.
84 See McCormick Harvesting, 169 U.S. at 610–12 (holding that if a reissue application is rejected
or abandoned, the original claims are not extinguished).
85 See II ANTHONY W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 319 (1937); see also Fresenius, 721 F.3d
at 1336.
86 Peck v. Collins, 103 U.S. 660, 664 (1880).
87 Moffitt v. Garr, 66 U.S. 273, 283 (1861).
88 Id.
81
82
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The Supreme Court repeatedly applied Moffitt after the 1870 statutory
amendment.89 In Meyer v. Pritchard,90 the Supreme Court held that the
cancellation of a patent mooted the appeal:
Since the appeal in this case, the appellants . . . have surrendered
the patent upon which the suit was brought . . . . If we should
hear the case and reverse the decree below, we could not decree
affirmative relief to the appellants . . . because the patent upon
which their rights depend has been canceled. There is no longer
any real or substantial controversy between those who appear as
parties to the suit upon the issues which have been joined, and
for that reason the appeal is dismissed . . . .91
In 1928, Congress created an exception to the rule that “all rights [a
patentee] had in and under the original patent are forfeited ab initio upon the
grant of the reissue.”92 Congress amended the reissue statute, authorizing
continuance of actions for infringement of the original claims after reissue, but
only “to the extent that [the reissued patent’s] claims are identical with the
original patent.”93 The Senate Report on the 1928 amendment explained that
the change was meant “simply to correct an almost unbelievable and inequitable
situation. Under the present law if a patentee applies for a reissue, no matter
for what purpose, all rights he had in and under the original patent are forfeited
ab initio upon the grant of the reissue.”94
As a result of this amendment, the reissue statute now provides that:
[E]very reissued patent shall have the same effect and operation
in law, on the trial of actions for causes thereafter arising, as if the
same had been originally granted in such amended form, but in
so far as the claims of the original and reissued patents are
substantially identical, such surrender shall not affect any action
then pending nor abate any cause of action then existing, and the

89 See Allen v. Culp, 166 U.S. 501, 505 (1897) (holding that the original patent “becomes
inoperative” on reissue); Reedy v. Scott, 90 U.S. 352, 364 (1874) (“[T]he effect of the surrender is
to extinguish the patent, and hence it can no more be the foundation for the assertion of a right
than can a legislative act which has been repealed without any saving clause of pending actions.”).
90 131 U.S. App’x CCIX (1877).
91 Id.
92 S. REP. NO. 70-567, at 1 (1928).
93 See Pub. L. No. 501, 45 Stat. 732, 732 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 64 (1928)).
94 S. REP. NO. 70-567, at 1; see also H.R. REP. NO. 70-1435, at 1–2 (1928) (similar).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/3

10

Kalkwarf: Stop in the Name of the PTO! A Review of the Fresenius Saga and P

2015]

STOP IN THE NAME OF THE PTO!

325

reissued patent, to the extent that its claims are substantially
identical with the original patent, shall constitute a continuation
thereof and have effect continuously from the date of the original
patent.95
While
prior to 1928 one could not recover for past infringement of a
reissued patent even if the claims were unchanged . . . the 1928
amendment expressly overruled this interpretation, and
authorized the reissue of patents to correct errors while enabling
recovery for past infringement of claims ‘identical’ to those in the
original patent.96
The amendment, however, did not change the rule that suits based on
cancelled claims require dismissal.97 When the patent is reissued, the original
claims that are not reissued in identical form become unenforceable.98 Thus,
the surrender of the original patent will not block any pending litigation or
terminate any cause of action to the “extent, but only to the extent, that the
claims of the original and reissue patents are identical.”99
The PTO “had no power to revoke, cancel, or annul” a previously issued
patent under the reissue statute unless a reissue proceeding had been initiated
by the patentee.100 In 1980, Congress changed the rules, authorizing ex parte
reexaminations to address deficiencies in the reissue statute.101 The ex parte
reexamination, like a reissuance, is a proceeding meant to correct or eliminate
erroneously granted patents.102 The reexamination statute authorized the PTO
35 U.S.C. § 252 (1999).
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
97 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1338.
98 See Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[T]he patentee has no
rights [in a non-identical claim] to enforce before the date of reissue because the original patent
was surrendered and is dead.”); Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818,
827 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The statute does not allow the claims of the original patent some other
form of survival. The original claims are dead.”).
99 4A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 15.05 (2013).
100 McCormick Harvesting, 169 U.S. at 612; see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
101 See Patent Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 301–307).
102 See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
95
96
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to reconsider patents of “doubtful” validity and to cancel “defectively examined
and therefore erroneously granted patent[s].”103
When a claim is determined to be invalid on reexamination, the Director of
the PTO is required to cancel the claim.104 The statute specifically declares:
In a reexamination proceeding under this chapter, when the time
for appeal has expired or any appeal proceeding has terminated,
the Director will issue and publish a certificate canceling any
claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable,
confirming any claim of the patent determined to be patentable,
and incorporating in the patent any proposed amended or new
claim determined to be patentable.105
“Even if the claim is amended during reexamination to render the claim
valid, no suit can be maintained for the period prior to the validating
amendment.”106 “To ensure that a person practicing a patented invention
would not be considered an infringer for the period between issuance of an
invalid patent and its conversion through reexamination to a valid patent,”107
Congress limited the enforcement of reissued claims to reexamined claims.108
Specifically:
Any proposed amended or new claim determined to be
patentable and incorporated into a patent following a
reexamination proceeding will have the same effect as that
specified in section 252 [35 U.S.C. § 252] for reissued patents on
the right of any person who [infringed] anything patented by such
proposed amended or new claim, . . . prior to issuance of a
[reexamination] certificate.109

103 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 602, 604; see also In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(describing “Congress’ purpose of allowing for a reexamination procedure to correct examiner
errors”).
104 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012).
105 Id.; see also id. § 306 (providing patentees with appeal rights from any PTO reexamination
“decision adverse to the patentability” of one or more claims).
106 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339.
107 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, at 8 (1980).
108 Id.
109 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2012).
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The Federal Circuit has explained that the reexamination statute restricts a
patentee’s ability to enforce the patent’s original claims to those claims that
survive reexamination in “identical” form.110
The Federal Circuit has concluded that the cancellation of claims during
reexamination would preclude maintenance of a stayed interference suit
involving the same claims.111 The court explained:
[T]he reexamination, if carried to completion, is likely to result in
the cancellation of all of the claims of [the] patent [over the
interfering patent]. That in turn will require a dismissal of the
interfering patents suit, since a necessary condition for such an action
is the existence of two valid and interfering patents.112
Similarly, in a stayed infringement proceeding, “if the claims were canceled
in the reexamination, [it] would eliminate the need to try the infringement
issue.”113 In either situation, “a necessary condition for such an action is the
existence of [a] valid . . . patent[ ].”114 The effect of the cancellation of a patent
pursuant to the statute, according to the Federal Circuit, is “no insult
to . . . Article III.”115 Of course, the last thing anyone would want to do is to
insult Article III—insulting Article I is apparently another matter. Thus, “under
either the reissue or reexamination statute, if the PTO confirms the original
claim in identical form, a suit based on that claim may continue, but if the
original claim is cancelled or amended to cure invalidity, the patentee’s cause of
action is extinguished and the suit fails.”116

110 See, e.g., Bloom Eng’g Co. v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 129 F.3d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Unless
a claim granted or confirmed upon reexamination is identical to an original claim, the patent can
not be enforced against infringing activity that occurred before issuance of the reexamination
certificate.”); see, e.g., Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, Inc., 878 F.2d 1413, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Fortel Corp. v. Phone–Mate, Inc., 825 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
111 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339–40; Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
112 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1340 (emphasis in original) (quoting Slip Track Sys., 159 F.3d at 1340).
113 Slip Track Sys., 159 F.3d at 1341.
114 Id. at 1340; see also Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(noting that “[o]ne purpose of the reexamination procedure is to eliminate trial of that issue
(when the claim is canceled)”).
115 See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604.
116 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1340.
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IV. TIME TO REVISE THE RULES
Congress is entrusted under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution
to promote invention and innovation.117 As part of this duty, Congress has the
responsibility of establishing the rules and regulations it feels are necessary to
“promote the Progress of [the] . . . useful Arts.”118 Although the Supreme
Court has noted that Congress lacks carte blanche authority regarding patents
due to certain constitutional restrictions,119 a modification of the
aforementioned rule book needs to be developed and implemented to avoid the
senseless waste of time, money, and judicial resources as was seen in the
Fresenius cases.
Although the Federal Circuit insists that Congress wants reexaminations to
occur concurrent with any pending litigation,120 this rule must end. It must
cease for the benefit of the parties, for the benefit of the judiciary, and for the
benefit of the American economy.
Patent infringement litigation is so expensive that the cost involved can
destroy a company.121 Patent infringement suits have been estimated to involve
costs ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to tens of millions of
dollars.122 Millions of dollars wasted that could be more productively used in
research and development, plant expansions, and job creation.
The founding fathers charged Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 to
encourage discovery and innovation by allowing for the creation of limited
monopolies to reward innovation and economic growth.123 Ceaseless litigation
does not comply with this constitutional decree, it contradicts it.

117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”
118 Id.
119 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). Patents cannot be
perpetual and may not remove exiting knowledge from the public domain, nor may patents
prohibit or restrict access to materials which are already available to the public. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (2003); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
120 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1339 & n.7.
121 Joel T. Beres & Melissa Hunter Smith, The Supreme Court Redefines “Exceptionality” and Lowers
Bar for Recovery of Attorney Fees in Patent Suits, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1 (June 2014).
122 John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-Infringement Injunctions, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 2075, 2091 (2014).
123 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151; Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–9.
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V. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY SHOULD REPEAT ITSELF
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
created under the Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982,124 district court
judgments in patent cases were appealed to the applicable regional circuit courts
of appeals.125 Because multiple regional circuits were involved, variances in
patent jurisprudence existed.126 Due to this diversity, the statute’s objective in
establishing the Federal Circuit was to create “a specialized appellate court for
patent cases [to increase] ‘doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.’ ”127
Thus, Congress created the Federal Circuit as the single appellate court for
patents to ensure a “more stable and predictable” forum for patent issues.128
Unlike the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is limited to
specific subjects with national scope.129 The Federal Circuit’s conception can
be traced to proposals made by the Hruska Commission in studying the
caseload problems that were being experienced by the federal courts.130 It was
during the work on this study that the problems involving patent litigation were
brought to the attention of Congress.131
The Patent and Trademark Office was responsible for the initial
determinations of patentability.132 Although the Patent and Trademark Office
was allowed to create its own theories concerning patentability, those theories,
along with the decisions of its reviewing court, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, did not bind other federal courts.133 Because the regional
circuits eroded a patent’s presumption of validity by utterly failing to attempt to
create uniformity in patent law,134 the economic value of patents declined.135
Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
Lynda J. Oswald, Simplifying Multiactor Patent Infringement Cases Through Proper Application of
Common Law Doctrine, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6 (2014).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 7; S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–27 (1981) (presenting “the purpose, background, and need for the
legislation”).
128 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16; H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23.
129 Oswald, supra note 125, at 7; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
130 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1989). The Commission was named in recognition of its chair, Senator Roman Hruska
of Nebraska. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 23. The report may
be found at Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure & Internal Procedures:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
131 Dreyfuss, supra note 130, at 6.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 6.
124
125
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The irresponsibility of the circuits to achieve patent harmony resulted in a
stifling of the useful arts, suffocating business incentives to invest in research
and development.136
The Federal Circuit’s duty was to create order from chaos.137 The single
appellate forum, like the single litigation forum proposal in this article, was
designed to eliminate the wasteful litigation of the past through uniform
jurisprudence.138 The single court concept was to promote technology and
innovation.139
VI. UNITING FOR THE COMMON GOOD
This is no longer the 1980s, and the two front strategy in challenging the
validity of a patent needs to go the way of the polyester pantsuit. Congress
needs to examine the problem illustrated by the Fresenius cases. Allowing such a
strategy is destructive to all involved—history proves this point. Whether it was
the Napoleonic Wars or either of the World Wars, when a country is forced to
do battle on two or more fronts, collapse due to a lack of resources is
inevitable.
The same is true in a patent litigation proceeding. To characterize patent
litigation as anything less than costly economic combat is to view such bouts in
a fantasy land. Under the current available procedures, a party challenging the
validity of a patent may attack the patent administratively in the PTO and
judicially in the courts.140 Just as in a two-front war, which history has proven
to be so devastating, a patent holder may be forced to defend the patent in both
costly forums.
This is not to say that an invalid patent should be protected. To the
contrary, if a patent is invalid, its knowledge, however valuable, belongs to the
citizenry.141 What Congress needs to do is to restrict patent challenges to one
front at a time.
The Fresenius Saga represents the idol god of two-front waste. Fresenius’s
legal front began in 2003 in the Northern District of California.142 Two years
later, Fresenius filed its request for the ex parte examination with the PTO
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id. at 7.
Dreyfuss, supra note 130, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1331–32, 1334–35, 1339–40.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1332.
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regarding the contested claims in the ’434 patent.143 Months later, the PTO
agreed a substantial question of patentability had been raised due to new prior
art, thereby granting the reexamination request.144
By January 2006, the parties and the district court were on notice that the
PTO was concerned that the claims in question did not meet the requirements
of patentability. In December, the PTO made the initial determination that the
claims were obvious,145 with the final determination rejecting the claims
occurring a year later.146 Thus, in December 2007, just four years after the
initial filing of the lawsuit, the PTO had determined that the claims were invalid.
The parties continued to litigate the patent by appealing the PTO’s December
2007 decision administratively through the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences147 to the Federal Circuit, which ultimately upheld the rejection of
the claims.148
Despite the initial warning by the PTO in January 2006, with a final
determination rejecting the claims in December 2007, the parties proceeded to
waste six years and a fortune in litigation costs just to reaffirm a 2007 decision
by the PTO that had been repeatedly upheld on appeal.
VII. THE NEW RULE
The solution to this chaotic litigation Ferris wheel is for Congress to grant
the PTO the authority to order a stay of any federal court proceeding until the
PTO resolves a reexamination proceeding which may be pending during a
litigation action. The idea is not without precedent.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), Congress directed automatic stays be imposed
upon judicial proceedings when a debtor files for bankruptcy.149 This same
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 1334; In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d at 1360.
Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3)
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities, of –
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
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principle may be applied when a reexamination has been filed with the PTO.
This proposal, however, presents four separate scenarios that must be analyzed
before the appropriate solution is chosen. As with all plans, each have their
benefits and drawbacks.
A. THE SPARK

The spark focuses on the earliest moment when a stay can be issued. This
would be the instant when an ex parte reexamination is filed with the PTO.
The advantage with providing an immediate stay at this time is that all litigation
is halted at the earliest possible moment. The parties are no longer focused on
the expense of litigation and may wait until the PTO decides the question
regarding the validity of the claims or patent in question.
The biggest problem with this proposal? Abuse. The proposal, although
the most attractive with regards to conserving costs related to litigation, is the
one most open to abuse by the litigants. This procedure would be a legislative
beatification of the litigation mantra: Delay, Delay, Delay.150
When a defendant is sued for a patent infringement, the entity can
immediately halt the litigation proceeding by requesting a reexamination.
Whether the reexamination has merit or not, the alleged infringer can
unnecessarily delay the litigation process while still continuing to infringe upon
the patent. Appropriately harsh sanctions for meritless reexamination requests
may prove necessary to curtail this abuse.
B. THE SMOKE

The second opportunity to stay any judicial proceeding would be at the
moment a PTO examiner believes that a substantial question of patentability
has been raised and the request for reexamination is granted, as what happened
in Fresenius.151 This moves the needle of credibility regarding the reexamination
request further towards the range of legitimacy. Unlike the first option, where
the alleged infringer can halt the judicial proceedings simply by filing a
reexamination request regardless of merit, requiring a stay once the PTO has
made an initial review of the request prevents frivolous reexamination requests
from blocking legitimate legal proceedings.

150 Lou Chang, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and Its Impact Upon the Collective Bargaining
Arbitration Process, 18 HI. B.J. 4, 14 (2014).
151 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
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To obtain such a grant requires the showing of “a substantial new question
of patentability affecting any claim of a patent.”152 Further, the PTO examiner
must make a determination on whether to grant the request within three
months of the filing date of the ex parte reexamination request.153 Thus, the
PTO’s initial decision on the motion is made very quickly after the motion is
filed. Further, “a substantial new question of patentability” is not an
insignificant standard to satisfy.154
The problem with this benchmark is that it is still relatively early in the
reexamination process. More importantly, the patent holder is not allowed to
respond to the reexamination request prior to the reexamination
determination.155 Any response to the reexamination request that may be filed
by the patent owner will not be acknowledged or considered in the
reexamination determination.156 In fact, any such statement will be returned or
discarded at the PTO’s option.157 Thus, given that the patent holder has not
had the opportunity to file a response, it would seem unfair, from a due process
perspective, to issue the stay at this point of the administrative process. It is the
equivalent of evaluating a book after reading the first chapter. The first chapter
should pique your interest, but it does not tell you the whole story. Further,
more in-depth research by the PTO in granting the motion may lead to an
ultimate finding that the claims were valid and the grant of the reexamination
request was for naught. Thus, the issuance of the stay when the reexamination
is granted could needlessly delay court litigation.
C. FIRE

The next logical benchmark at which the PTO could issue the stay is when
an examiner has reached an initial determination.158 At this point, the PTO has
had the opportunity to address the concerns raised in the reexamination request
and engage in the necessary research.
Although this benchmark may not be the earliest possible option in issuing a
stay, it does occur relatively early in the overall litigation landscape. Placed in
perspective under the facts of Fresenius, it took less than one year between when
35 U.S.C. § 304; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(1).
37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a).
154 THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURES § 2242 (9th ed. 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep//
s2242.html.
155 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(a).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1334.
152
153
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the PTO granted the request for the reexamination and the initial
determination, and less than two years from when the ex parte reexamination
was filed.159
The detriment of issuing the stay at this point is that the PTO’s final
determination could be the opposite of the initial determination.160 Practically
speaking, given the amount of money at stake, the delay in this option, although
potentially unnecessary, imposes only a slight burden in the overall litigation
process. Using the facts of Fresenius as an example, only a year passed between
the initial determination by the PTO examiner and the examiner’s final
determination.161 Given that the Federal Circuit issued its final Fresenius
decision ten years after the filing of the complaint162 and six years after the
PTO’s final determination,163 a mere one-year delay to save millions of dollars
in expenses is an extremely tenable economic compromise.
D. FOUR ALARM FIRE

The fourth benchmark would be when the PTO issues its final
determination regarding the reexamination request. The advantage of delaying
the stay until this moment would be to ensure that the PTO had finally
determined the validity of the patent in question, in the agency’s opinion. The
disadvantage is that it allows the parallel litigation to proceed for a considerable
time. If the PTO concludes that the patent is still valid, no harm is done and
the court proceedings are not delayed or unnecessarily impeded. In contrast, if
the final determination is one of invalidity, then the parties and court may have
expended needless resources during the agency’s review process on an invalid
patent.
In Fresenius, the final decision was issued in December 2007, two years after
the ex parte request, one year after the initial determination, but four years after
Although arguably not long after the
the litigation was initiated.164
reexamination request was made, years of litigation had still been needlessly
expended on invalid claims.

159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id. at 1335 (This is the reason why the district court in Fresenius refused to issue a stay.).
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1330, 1332.
Id. at 1333–34
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E. APPEASING ACADEMIA
To appease the egos of academia and their relentless criticisms, there are
other benchmarks at which a stay may be issued. The first is when a party
appeals an examiner’s final decision to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
previously known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.165 The
second is when the Board issues its determination. The third is when there is
an appeal of the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit. The fourth is when the
Federal Circuit issues a decision on the appeal. The fifth is when a party
petitions for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The sixth would be
when the Supreme Court grants the petition of certiorari.
Only the first and second of these scenarios would be applicable to the stay
proposal, as these are the only two events still within the administrative universe
of the patent office. The remaining scenarios occur in the realm of black-robed
judges.
The seismic fault of waiting until an appeal is made to the Board or when
the Board issues its decision is delay. The objective of the stay is not to wait
until the last possible abstract scenario to allow the patent office to issue a stay.
If that were the objective, the answer would be simple. The stay would be
issued when the Board renders its decision finding invalidity.166 But this is not
the purpose of the proposed stay. The goals of the stay are to save the parties
from the economic destruction of litigation costs and avoid the erosion of
valuable judicial resources. These goals are not satisfied by waiting to issue a
stay until an appeal is made to the Board or until the Board issues a decision. It
simply allows for the waste of valuable economic resources.
Applying these two options under the facts of Fresenius, the Board upheld
the examiner’s final determination in March 2010.167 This decision was seven
years after the litigation began168 and five years after the reexamination request
was made.169 That is seven years of needless litigation that would have
transpired if the patent office were prohibited from issuing a stay until this
benchmark.

165 Under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 7(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284,
313 (2011), the Board’s name was changed from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. In order to avoid confusion in this Article with the facts of
Fresenius, the term “Board” will be used in the remainder of this Article.
166 A party has six months from the examiner’s decision to seek an appeal with the Board. 37
C.F.R. § 1.134.
167 Fresenius, 721 F.3d at 1335.
168 Id. at 1332.
169 Id. at 1334.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2015

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3

336

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 22:315

Judged by the events which had occurred in in the courts, by March 2010, a
jury had rendered a verdict in Fresenius’s favor, only to have the district court
grant Baxter’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; a jury trial on damages
had been conducted, and Baxter was awarded damages; a permanent injunction
was issued; the case had been appealed, argued, and a decision by the Federal
Circuit was issued, remanding the case to the district court; and further
proceedings had been conducted in the district court.170 Thus, two jury trials,
post-judgment decisions, an appeal, an appellate decision, and additional postappeal proceedings had all occurred while the administrative process was
proceeding in the patent office. The economics of an administrative stay
cannot be more evident.
VIII. REVOLUTION AND RESOLUTION
The proposed scenarios, as with many hypothetical ideas, carry both
detriments and benefits, problems and solutions. But despite the challenges the
scenarios present, they each are better than the status quo. The question left
unresolved is which potential solution is the best. Which benchmark will provide
the best benefits for the parties and the judiciary in terms of time and economics?
Which benchmark will “promote the Progress of . . . [the] . . . useful Arts?”171
The answer is not easy. Answers to tough problems are never easy. The
best solution is when the PTO examiner grants the request for a reexamination.
Admittedly, it is a difficult decision to choose between when the
reexamination is granted and when the PTO has issued a preliminary
determination. At the point of the preliminary determination, the PTO has had
the opportunity to take the time and effort to research and address the merits of
the reexamination request. If the PTO concludes at the initial determination
that the claims appear valid, the parallel litigation is not interrupted. Should the
PTO find an issue regarding the validity of the patent, the parties and court are
forewarned, and the PTO is given the opportunity to further investigate and
possibly invalidate the patent.
However, the objective of the recommendation is to find that moment of
convergence when enough facts are available to the PTO so as to give the
agency concern that there are issues with the patent without needlessly
hindering any court proceedings. The earlier option of issuing the stay when
the reexamination is granted is the option that meets this criteria. The goal is to
save the parties and courts time and money. Unfortunately, this benchmark has
170
171

Id. at 1332–33.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the flaw that the patent owner is prohibited from filing a response to the
reexamination request.172
Given the one-sided nature of the decision, would it be wise for the courts
to be leery of the PTO’s decision when a reexamination request is granted? The
answer is yes. However, the standard in order to obtain the grant of a
reexamination request is of such significance that the logic of obtaining a stay at
this point in the administrative process should not be ignored. The request may
only be granted if the examiner believes that there is “a substantial new question
of patentability.”173 Given this high standard which must be met and the
objective of saving the parties and the judiciary time and resources, the stay
should be automatically issued when a request for reexamination is granted.
IX. WILL THE COURTS WHISTLE THE PROPOSAL FOR PASSING FORWARD?174
Can a proposal that is so simple and so logical be unconstitutional? When
attorneys wearing $2,500 suits and $30,000 watches, who make a fortune in
patent litigation disputes, face a significant income loss from such a stay, these
advocates of justice will attack this proposal like a group of rabid skunks.
Therefore, undoubtedly, the suggestions of this Article will eventually come
under constitutional attack. And yet, despite whatever constitutional arguments
may be raised, the proposal survives such scrutiny.
At least one commentator has questioned whether administrative agencies,
such as the PTO, have frustrated the founding fathers’ “intricate system” of
checks and balances between the three branches of government.175 Specifically,
the balance between Congress and the courts. His concern centers on the
quasi-legislative role of rulemaking and the quasi-judicial function of
adjudication.176 The Supreme Court “has reasoned that the judiciary’s
independence from the political branches must be ‘jealously guarded,’ even at
great expense.”177 However, the Court has also recognized that Congress,
37 C.F.R. § 1.530(a).
35 U.S.C. § 304; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b)(1).
174 Passing forward is also known as passe avant. IFV Inc., Glossary, CLASSICALFENCING.COM,
http://www.classicalfencing.com/glossary.php#p (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). The act of passing
forward involves placing the rear foot in front of the forward foot and then vice versa—essentially it
is a forward step. This action is illegal in sabre fencing. Glossary of fencing, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glossary_of_fencing (last modified Apr. 30, 2015, 8:32pm).
175 Benjamin J. Christoff, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Additional Grounds for Post-Grant Review in
the America Invents Act Raise Issues with Separation of Powers and the Administrative Procedure Act, 39 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 111, 114 (2013).
176 Id.
177 Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982)).
172
173
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under Article I, the article we do not mind offending,178 has to be able to utilize
its constitutional authority, including “delegating the judicial power to nonArticle III tribunals.”179
The Supreme Court is seen as having created two diverse analyses.180 In the
first, the Court nullifies the delegation of judicial authority under Article III, the
article which cannot be offended,181 pursuant to “a strict, formalistic
approach.”182 The approach “rigidly preserves the separation of powers and
permits Congress to delegate the judicial authority only in a few limited
circumstances.”183 The second, alternative approach, upholds the “delegation
as amenable to the Constitution and promotion of government efficiency.”184
This analysis examines the function of the delegation, focusing “on whether the
core of Article III power has been displaced.”185
The morning coat, top hat, and high tea formalistic approach is
memorialized in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.186 In
Northern Pipeline, the Court examined Congress’s creation of the bankruptcy
courts, whose functions were to be adjudicates “to the federal district courts in
the area of bankruptcy.”187 Congress provided the bankruptcy courts the
authority to have subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising
under title 11.”188 Not only did the bankruptcy courts have the authority to
conduct jury trials, their “judgments were subject to review by Article III courts
under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.”189
Decreeing loudly that “the independence of the Judiciary [must] be jealously
guarded,”190 the Supreme Court held that Congress may delegate the judicial
powers of Article III in only three narrow situations.191 The Court ultimately
found the narrow exceptions inapplicable to the bankruptcy courts,192 thus

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
Christoff, supra note 175, at 114.
180 Id.
181 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
182 Christoff, supra note 175, at 114–15.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
186 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
187 Christoff, supra note 175, at 115.
188 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV)).
189 Id.
190 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 60.
191 Id. at 62–67 (identifying the three exceptions as “territorial courts,” “martial courts,” and
“legislative courts and administrative agencies . . . to adjudicate cases involving ‘public rights’ ”).
192 Id. at 71.
178
179
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finding the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional for offending Article III,193
which as everyone now knows cannot and will not be offended.194
With respect to patents, the most relevant of the three exceptions is the one
concerning public rights.195 While academia, not surprisingly, has engaged in
the Socratic mental gymnastics of determining whether patent rights are public
or private, simply put:
Private rights are those involving liability of one to another;
public rights are those arising “between the government and
others.” An example of a public right is the right under an
agency’s complex regulatory scheme to compensation in
exchange for disclosing information on a new insecticide. An
example of a private right is the ownership of land.196
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, according to the commentator,
may be “at odds over the nature of the patent right.”197 Appearing to designate
patent rights as private, the Supreme Court has stated that a patent is “the
property of the patentee . . . [and] is entitled to the same legal protection as
other property.”198 Thus, the patent has a presumption of validity that must be
litigated only before an Article III court.199 In contrast, the commentator
observes that the Federal Circuit “has repeatedly indicated that the patent right
is a public right by virtue of the fact that it is the government that issues the
patent.”200 The Federal Circuit has upheld “the PTO’s ability to reclaim postissuance jurisdiction in order to reexamine patents issued by mistake.”201 As if
the Constitution were a Halloween pumpkin, the Federal Circuit can arguably
be said to have carved out an exception to Article III, allowing the PTO to
rectify its mistakes made during the patent prosecution.202 The Supreme Court
has yet to address this issue.203
The propriety of review by the PTO hinges on this private-public
dichotomy:
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 76.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
Christoff, supra note 175, at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing McCormick Harvesting, 169 U.S. at 609).
Christoff, supra note 175, at 116.
Id. (citing Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604).
Id. (citing Patlex, 758 F.2d 606–07).
Id.
Id.
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If patent rights are essentially private, then a strong argument can
be made that jurisdiction over factual issues concerning patent
validity that arise after issuance—in addition to legal issues—
should be reserved to the constitutional courts rather than an
agency. Conversely, if patent rights are public, then the post–
issuance question of patent validity may rightly be resolved by the
PTO, which administers the public right.204
The commentator concludes:
the Supreme Court’s formalistic approach to Article III questions
ardently protects the authority of federal courts and looks with
skepticism on any displacement of its power. It names three
narrow exceptions in which Congress may delegate adjudicative
jurisdiction under its Article I legislative power. Like Article III
jurisprudence generally, the public rights exception is unclear with
respect to patent rights. Under the formalistic approach, the Supreme
Court is likely to strike down a congressional delegation of the judicial power
to a non-Article III tribunal.205
Further, under the Supreme Court’s functional approach, the Court
examines whether Congress has merged governmental powers in such a way
that the core of the judiciary’s function “has been usurped and placed in the
hands of another branch.”206 The approach focuses on substance “rather than
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories.”207 The Court has listed several
factors that are to be considered when analyzing whether Congress has
threatened the integrity of the judiciary.208 These factors include: (1) the extent
the “essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts”; (2)
the extent “the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts”; (3) “the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated”; and (4) the reasons Congress
departed from Article III’s requirements.209

204
205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 117 n.53.
Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1986)).
Id. at 118.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss2/3

26

Kalkwarf: Stop in the Name of the PTO! A Review of the Fresenius Saga and P

2015]

STOP IN THE NAME OF THE PTO!

341

The Court has found the public rights exception depends on the substance
of the claims instead of the parties.210 Thus, the federal government does not
need to be a party for public rights to be involved.211 Conversely, the federal
government’s position as a party does not necessarily mean that a public right is
involved.212 Thus, Article I permits agencies to conduct a “complex regulatory
scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program
without providing an Article III adjudication.”213 The Supreme Court has
stated that where private rights are in dispute in a non-Article III forum, the
role of the tribunal is limited to fact-finding, and any legal rulings are
advisory.214
Under the aforementioned commentator’s analysis, the post-grant review of
35 U.S.C. § 324(b) should be considered the next apocalypse upon the
Constitution. However, his concerns are simply inapplicable to the proposed
procedural stay in this case. Patents are within the exclusive authority of Article
I. It is Congress who is responsible for designing rules and procedures
regarding patents. The debate of whether the patent is private or public does
not implicate a constitutional plague upon the stay proposal. 215
Further, Article III provides Congress with the authority to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Under the proposal, Congress could limit a
federal court’s authority to proceed with patent litigation cases until a parallel
administrative proceeding is resolved. Indeed, there is clear precedent for such
authority. As previously noted, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) automatically stays
pending Article III judicial proceedings when a bankruptcy action is filed.216
The stay is also consistent with nearly two hundred years of Supreme Court
precedent.217 By authorizing the stay, Congress is allowing the PTO to exercise
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146–47, 152
See supra Part VII and accompanying text.
Grant, 31 U.S. at 242:
If the mistake should be committed in the department of state, no one would
say that it ought not to be corrected. All would admit that a new patent,
correcting the error, and which would secure to the patentee the benefits which
the law intended to secure, ought to be issued. And yet the act does not in
terms authorise [sic] a new patent, even in this case. Its emanation is not
founded on the words of the law, but is indispensably necessary to the faithful
execution of the solemn promise made by the United States. Why should not
the same step be taken for the same purpose, if the mistake has been innocently
committed by the inventor himself?
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its current authority to correct its errors, invalidate claims, and extinguish the
patent, resulting in the discontinuation of pending litigation. The administrative
stay is nothing more than a time-out in the long, hard-fought gamesmanship
that is patent litigation.
The stay does not involve the private property verses public right debate.
The stay does not threaten the integrity of the judiciary.218 The stay involves
neither fact-finding, nor legal rulings. The stay simply stops the judicial
proceedings to allow the PTO to exercise its administrative duties and allow its
administrative decisions to be judicially reviewed by Article III courts before
any derivative judicial action continues.
The courts are not deprived of any authority to address the validity of the
patent. The review is simply restricted to one forum at a time. The proposal
allows Article I and Article III to operate as a coordinated pair. For these
reasons, the stay would not offend the Constitution and the proposed
procedure would overcome any constitutional challenge.
X. THE COUP DE GRÂCE219
Sanctified with the blessings of the founding fathers, constitutionally
protected in Article I, Congress is required to “promote the Progress
of . . . [the] . . . useful Arts.”220 Patents are designed to reward innovation and
improvements.221 So, it is completely logical that improvements also be offered
and implemented in this country’s patent process. An administrative stay to
pending patent litigation is one such improvement. Based upon a bankruptcy
procedure, granting the PTO the authority to administratively stay a judicial
proceeding to allow the agency to reexamine the validity of a patent is beneficial
to the parties and the courts. Should the agency determine the patent invalid,
the parties address the dispute in one, not two forums. More importantly, the
limited and valuable time of the federal judiciary is not needlessly wasted on a
patent that may ultimately be invalidated by the patent office. Therefore, to
improve the patent system, to prevent the needless economic annihilation of

Christoff, supra note 175, at 118.
A coup de grâce, literally “blow of mercy,” is a killing blow intended to relieve the suffering of
a wounded person or animal, and is, thus, irrelevant to most forms of fencing. It is important to
pronounce the “s” sound at the end of grâce. Otherwise you are left saying “blow of fat.” Coup de
grace Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%2
0de%20grâce (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
221 John Morgan & Veronica Sandoval, Pacific Northwest Perspective: The Impact of the America Invents
Act on Nonprofit Global Health Organizations, 9 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 177, 181–82 (2014).
218
219
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companies, to save American jobs, and to allow the “useful Arts” to
“Progress,”222 the power to allow the PTO to issue an administrative stay
should be anointed by Congress.

222

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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